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We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period
before an agreement is reached, the proposer’s identity (and whether there
is a proposer) are randomly determined; the proposer suggests a division of
a pie of size one; each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal;
and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning
coalition for the proposer. The theory of the ﬁxed point index is used to show
that stationary equilibrium expected payoﬀs of this coalitional bargaining
game are unique. This generalizes Eraslan (2002) insofar as: (a) there are
no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions; (b) diﬀerent
proposers may have diﬀerent sets of winning coalitions; (c) there may be a
positive probability that no proposer is selected.
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dex.1 Introduction
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) study a model in which a group of n risk neutral
agents divide a ﬁxed pie. In each period a proposer (or “formateur”) is
selected randomly, the proposer suggests a division of the pie, and this
division is implemented if it is approved by a winning coalition of the agents.
Otherwise the process is repeated until agreement is achieved, with payoﬀs
discounted geometrically. They show that when the model is symmetric in
the sense that all agents have the same recognition probability (probability of
being selected as the proposer) and discount factor, and a winning coalition
is any set of k agents, in all stationary subgame perfect equilibria agreement
is reached in the ﬁrst period with probability one and each agent’s ex ante
expected utility is 1/n.
For the application motivating Baron and Ferejohn (bargaining among
parties in a legislature or parliament) it is natural to suppose that recog-
nition probabilities diﬀer across agents, with larger parties typically having
higher recognition probabilities. In a committee one would normally ex-
pect that the chair’s recognition probability is higher than the recognition
probabilities of other members. For several years it was unknown whether
there could be multiple stationary subgame perfect equilibria yielding dif-
ferent expected utilities when recognition probabilities or discount factors
diﬀer across agents. Eraslan (2002) resolved this problem, showing that,
even with unequal recognition probabilities and discount factors, there is a
single vector of expected utilities common to all stationary subgame perfect
equilibria.
Her analysis is restricted to k-majority rule for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, but in leg-
islative settings it is also natural to allow diﬀerent agents to have diﬀerent
weights in the voting over approval of a proposal. This direction of gener-
alization is also of interest from the point of view of other applications. In
corporate bankruptcies governed by Chapter 11, the voting over approval of
a proposed reorganization is asymmetric with respect to diﬀerent seniority
classes of debt, and creditors who are owed more money have greater power.
Other examples are described in the next section.
Here we show that, under more general conditions than those consid-
ered by Eraslan (2002), there is a unique vector of expected payoﬀs that is
generated by all of the game’s stationary subgame perfect equilibria. Specif-
ically, in addition to allowing diﬀerent agents to have diﬀerent recognition
probabilities and discount factors, we allow the set of winning coalitions to
be arbitrary, and to depend on the proposer, and we allow the sum of the
recognition probabilities to be less than one.
1Our argument has an interesting mathematical structure. Suppose that
C is a nonempty compact convex set and F : C → C is an upper semicontin-
uous convex valued correspondence. Roughly, the ﬁxed point index assigns
an integer to each compact set of ﬁxed points of F that has a neighborhood
containing no other ﬁxed points. For any partition of the set of ﬁxed points
into such sets, the sum of the indices of the sets must be one. We show that
each connected component of the set of ﬁxed points of the relevant corre-
spondence has a neighborhood that has no other ﬁxed points, and that its
index is one. Consequently the set of ﬁxed points must consist of a single
connected component. We also show that the vector of continuation pay-
oﬀs is constant in each connected component, so our main result follows.
As has been noted (cf. p. 615 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995)) this method of
proving uniqueness is widely applicable, but in all earlier cases we know of
elementary methods were also available.
The organization of the remainder is as follows. Section 2 describes some
of the extensive literature descended from Baron and Ferejohn (1989) as it
relates to our work. The model, and a “reduced equilibrium” concept moti-
vated by stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, are explained in Section 3.
Section 4 shows that the set of reduced equilibria is the set of ﬁxed points of
a correspondence satisfying the hypotheses of Kakutani’s theorem. Section
5 presents the axioms that characterize the ﬁxed point index, along with
their relevant consequences, and a general version of our uniqueness result,
emphasizing its mathematical structure. Section 6 veriﬁes that the hypothe-
ses of the general uniqueness theorem are satisﬁed by the model, thereby
proving the main result. Some possible topics for further research on this
topic are sketched in Section 7. An Appendix gives a precise description of
the bargaining protocol and shows that every stationary subgame perfect
equilibrium has an associated reduced equilibrium, and that every reduced
equilibrium is derived from some stationary subgame perfect equilibrium.
2 Related Literature
Since Baron and Ferejohn’s paper, an extensive body of work has grown
out of their model1. There are many variants of the basic model, and many
1With apologies for the inevitable omissions, a fairly comprehensive list is: Baron
(1989), Baron (1991), McKelvey and Riezman (1992), Okada (1993), Merlo and Wilson
(1995), Baron (1996), Calvert and Dietz (1996), Okada (1996), Winter (1996), Chari
et al. (1997), Persson (1998), Baron (1998), Diermeier and Feddersen (1998), Banks and
Duggan (2000), McCarty (2000b), McCarty (2000a), Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002),
Eraslan (2002), Eraslan and Merlo (2002), Jackson and Moselle (2002), Norman (2002),
2ways in which the bargaining model might be embedded into some periods
of larger dynamic models. The number and diversity of applications in the
literature suggest that the methodology pioneered by Baron and Ferejohn
(1989) has established itself as an important tool for addressing a central is-
sue of political science: the relationship between the rules governing political
institutions and the outcomes they produce.
Perhaps the main alternatives would be the power indices of cooperative
game theory. In Section 7 we describe how our result opens the way to
similar power indices with explicit noncooperative foundations.
As in other types of social scientiﬁc modelling, models with unique (or
perhaps ﬁnitely many) predictions are preferred for many reasons. As a
practical matter, tractable empirical methodologies typically limit attention
to models with unique predictions because available statistical methods have
little to say about selection of an equilibrium when more than one are avail-
able. Indeed, there are already several studies (e.g., Diermeier et al. (2003),
Adachi and Watanabe (2008), Diermeier and Merlo (2004), Ansolabehere
et al. (2005), Coscia (2005)) taking the Baron-Ferejohn model to data, and
our result has direct application to several previous papers (e.g., Winter
(1996), McCarty (2000b), Ansolabehere et al. (2003), Snyder et al. (2005))
either strengthening the work by providing uniqueness results that were
not available to the authors, or allowing uniqueness to be proved under
weaker hypotheses. In addition, the literature contains models (e.g., Mc-
Carty (2000a)) that would become instances of our framework after small
modiﬁcations. It seems natural to expect that further development of the
literature will lead to additional applications, and that our uniqueness result
will inﬂuence model selection in some instances; indeed, Montero (2007) has
already applied our result in an analysis of the Council of Ministers of the
European Union.
The introduction has already described some of the history of unique-
ness results for the Baron-Ferejohn model. In addition to Eraslan (2002),
papers concerned with uniqueness of equilibrium expected payoﬀs include
Norman (2002), Yan (2002), Cho and Duggan (2003), Cardona and Ponsati
(2007), and Montero (2006). Norman (2002) shows that equilibrium pay-
oﬀs may fail to be unique when there are ﬁnitely many bargaining periods.
Cho and Duggan (2003) and Cardona and Ponsati (2007) consider models in
Yan (2002), Ansolabehere et al. (2003), Cho and Duggan (2003), Diermeier et al. (2003),
Diermeier and Merlo (2004), Coscia (2005), Knight (2005), Snyder et al. (2005), Banks and
Duggan (2006), Kalandrakis (2006), Battaglini and Coate (2007), Cardona and Ponsati
(2007), Montero (2007), Predtetchinski (2007), Yıldırım (2007), Adachi and Watanabe
(2008), Battaglini and Coate (2008), Yıldırım (2008).
3which the space of outcomes is one dimensional, modelling policy concerns
rather than private rewards. Cho and Duggan (2003) establish uniqueness
when utility functions are quadratic and provide an example with multiple
equilibria when the utility functions are not quadratic. Cardona and Pon-
sati (2007) establish uniqueness in the case of unanimity and asymptotic
uniqueness as the discount factor goes to one. Yıldırım (2007, 2008) ana-
lyzes models in which recognition probabilities are determined by agents’
eﬀorts, either in each period (for unanimity rule and k-majority rule) or
persistently (for unanimity rule) in the sense that eﬀort in the initial period
determines a single vector of recognition probabilities governing the process
in all subsequent periods.
Recall that a cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) con-
sists of a set of agents N = {1,... ,n} together with a speciﬁcation of a
payoﬀ v(S) ∈ R for each coalition S ⊂ N. Generalizing results in Okada
(1993) that did not appear in Okada (1996), Yan (2002) studies the bargain-
ing protocol analyzed here, with general recognition probabilities, applied
to a TU game with a nonempty core, showing that an allocation in the core
is realized as the vector of continuation values if and only if it coincides
with the vector of recognition probabilities, in which case there are no other
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀs.
A TU game is said to be simple if each coalition’s payoﬀ is either zero
or one. That is, a simple game is essentially a speciﬁcation of a system
of winning coalitions. Since we study simple games, which rarely have a
nonempty core, the overlap of her results with ours is small. A TU game is
proper if it is simple and v(S) = 1 implies that v(T) = 0 for all T ⊂ N \ S.
Montero (2006) generalizes the restriction of Yan’s theorem to proper games,
as follows: if the vector of recognition probabilities is in the nucleus2 and the
sum of recognition probabilities over the members of each winning coalition
is at least 1/2, then the vector of recognition probabilities is the unique
vector of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀs. The uniqueness
assertion is a special case of our result. Okada (2007) extends some of
this analysis to a model in which bargaining among the remaining players
continues after an agreement by a coalition other than the grand coalition.
Merlo and Wilson (1995) and Eraslan and Merlo (2002) study a gen-
eralization of the Baron-Ferejohn model in which the size of the pie varies
stochastically; Merlo and Wilson (1995) demonstrate uniqueness under una-
2The nucleus is the set of imputations minimizing the maximum, over all coalitions, of
the diﬀerence between the coalition’s worth and its aggregate allocation in the imputation.
It coincides with the core when the core is nonempty, and the nucleolus (cf. Schmeidler
(1969)) is always an element.
4nimity rule, and Eraslan and Merlo (2002) demonstrate nonuniqueness under
majority rule. Ali (2006) examines a variant of the Baron-Ferejohn model
in which agents have divergent, and optimistic, beliefs about the recognition
probabilities, ﬁnding that there are unique continuation payoﬀs even though
agreement need not be reached in the ﬁrst period.
3 The Model and Result
The agents in the set N := {1,... ,n} bargain over the division of a pie of
size 1 according to the following protocol. At the beginning of each period
until agreement is reached there is a random determination of whether there
will be a proposer and, if so, who that will be. The probability that agent i is
selected to be the proposer, denoted by pi, is called i’s recognition probability.
Let p := (p1,... ,pn) be the vector of recognition probabilities. Of course
we require that each pi is nonnegative, and also that p1+   +pn ≤ 1. Then
p0 := 1 − (p1 +     + pn) is the probability that there is no proposer.
If there is a proposer she selects a proposal from the set




of feasible allocations. There is a random determination of an ordering of
the agents, after which the agents each vote for or against the proposal, with
each agent seeing the votes of other agents in the ordering before selecting
her own vote. For each i there is a collection Si = {Si1,... ,SiKi} of subsets
of N, called winning coalitions for i. If i is the proposer and the set of
agents voting in favor is an element of Si, then the proposal is implemented,
ending the game. Otherwise the process is repeated in the next period. As
a matter of convention we assume that i is a member of every coalition in
Si. The utility for agent i if the proposal x is implemented in period t is δt
ixi
where δ = (δ1,... ,δn) ∈ (0,1)n is a vector of discount factors. If agreement
is never reached, then each agent’s utility is zero.
We are interested in the expected payoﬀs resulting from stationary sub-
game perfect equilibria of this game. Below we will deﬁne a notion called
“reduced equilibrium” which imposes conditions on the agents’ equilibrium
expected payoﬀs and their probabilities of including each other in minimal
winning coalitions. In the Appendix we deﬁne a notion of stationary sub-
game perfect equilibrium for the bargaining game. We show that if any
superset of a winning coalition for an agent is also a winning coalition for
5that agent, then each stationary subgame perfect equilibrium induces a re-
duced equilibrium, and each reduced equilibrium is induced by at least one
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. This is technically demanding, but
unsurprising (the voting protocol was carefully designed with these results in
mind) and its primary purpose is to provide one noncooperative foundation
for our interest in reduced equilibrium.
Although the intuitive justiﬁcation for the reduced equilibrium concept
depends on supersets of winning coalitions being winning coalitions, the def-
inition itself, and the subsequent analysis, does not. It is, at least hypotheti-
cally, possible that there is a derivation of this concept from noncooperative
analysis that does not depend on that assumption.
We now give an intuitive description of the reduced equilibrium concept.
Prior to the beginning of the initial period, agent i has an expected payoﬀ
for the game, which is denoted by vi. This consists of three parts:
(a) the probability p0 that no proposer is selected times the discounted
value δivi of the game beginning in the next period;
(b) δivi, which is the minimum payment required to induce a vote in favor
of the proposal, times the sum over all agents (including herself) of
that agent’s recognition probability times the probability that agent i
is included in that proposer’s coalition;
(c) the recognition probability pi times the surplus wi net of payments to
coalitions members (including herself) in that event.
If she is the proposer she will make a proposal that consists of oﬀering δjvj
(or, intuitively, slightly more to insure acceptance) to each member of one
of her winning coalitions, the rest of the pie to herself, and zero to everyone
else. In particular, equilibrium is eﬃcient in the sense that agreement is
reached in the ﬁrst period in which there is a proposer. Each agent has a
probability distribution over winning coalitions when she is the proposer,
and of course this distribution assigns positive probability only to those
coalitions that minimize expenditures on coalition partners.
For each agent the crucial characteristics of an equilibrium are the min-
imal cost of forming a winning coalition when she is the proposer and the
aggregate probability of being included in another agent’s winning coali-
tion. The latter probabilities can be achieved by various assignments of
probability to the proposers’ winning coalitions, so the probabilities that
the proposers assign to winning coalitions are indeterminate, and it is nat-
ural to try to reduce the analysis to conditions on the agents’ aggregate
6probabilities of being included. Unfortunately this does not work, because
it does not include enough information to analyze the minimal cost of a
winning coalition. Instead our analysis operates at an intermediate level
of aggregation. Speciﬁcally, we study the probabilities that each proposer
assigns to each possible coalition partner, which have the following descrip-
tion. For each i and Sik ∈ Si let ˜ Sik ∈ {0,1}n be the vector whose jth
component is 1 if j ∈ Sik and 0 otherwise. Let Yi ⊂ [0,1]n be the convex
hull of { ˜ Sik : Sik ∈ Si }, and let
Y := Y1 ×     × Yn,
regarded as a space of n × n matrices Y whose ith column yi is the element
of Yi. Then each Y ∈ Y has entries in [0,1] and ones on the diagonal. Let




elements of V are thought of as possible expected payoﬀ vectors of the game.
We can now deﬁne a reduced equilibrium to be a pair (v,Y ) ∈ V × Y
such that for each i:
(a) vi = (p0 +
 n
j=1pjyij)δivi + pi(1 −
 n
j=1 yjiδjvj);





Condition (a) expresses the decomposition of the equilibrium expected pay-
oﬀ described informally below. Condition (b), which requires that each
proposer minimizes the cost of coalition partners, has some important im-
plications for our analysis. First of all, because Y is the cartesian product
of the Yi, condition (b) holds for all i if and only if Y minimizes the total
expenditure on coalition partners, or the total expected sum, or in fact any
positive weighted sum of the agents’ expenditures.





is the total probability that i is included in a proposer’s coalition, given
the matrix of inclusion probabilities Y . Suppose that (v,Y ) is a reduced
equilibrium. If Y ′ ∈ Y with m(Y ′) = m(Y ), then each Y and Y ′ have each
agent included in winning coalitions with the same probability, in which
case the total expenditure on coalition partners is the same, so each pro-
poser is minimizing expenditure. Therefore, for each agent, the sum of the
7discounted continuation value, times the probability of receiving it, plus ex-
pected proposer surplus, is the same under (v,Y ′) and (v,Y ), so (v,Y ′) is
also a reduced equilibrium. The converse also holds:
Lemma 1. If (v,Y ) is a reduced equilibrium and Y ′ ∈ Y, then (v,Y ′) is a
reduced equilibrium if and only if m(Y ′) = m(Y ).
Proof. For each i let









Then condition (a) becomes vi = (p0+mi(Y ))δivi+piwi. By the observation
above, if m(Y ′) = m(Y ), then (v,Y ′) satisﬁes (b), and consequently wi =
w′
i, which implies that vi = (p0+mi(Y ′))δivi+piw′
i for all i, which is to say
that (a) holds.
Conversely, suppose that (v,Y ′) is also a reduced equilibrium. Then
condition (b) implies that wi = w′
i for all i, and condition (a) implies that
(p0 + mi(Y ))δivi + piwi = vi = (p0 + mi(Y ′))δivi + piwi
for all i, so that m(Y ′) = m(Y ).
Our main result characterizes the set of reduced equilibria.
Theorem 1. The set of reduced equilibria is nonempty, and there is a single
vector v ∈ V that is the ﬁrst component of every reduced equilibrium. If
(v,Y ) is a reduced equilibrium, then the set of all reduced equilibria is {v}×
m−1(m(Y )). In particular, the set of reduced equilibria is a convex polytope.
The lemma above implies that the set of reduced equilibria is
 
m−1(v)
where the union is over all v such that there is some Y such that (v,Y ) is
a reduced equilibrium. The rest of our analysis is concerned with showing
that there is a unique such v.
4 Reduced Equilibria as Fixed Points
This section describes a correspondence whose ﬁxed points correspond to
reduced equilibria. For the time being we ﬁx v ∈ Rn and Y ∈ Y. Our ﬁrst
goal is to show that if condition (a) of the deﬁnition of reduced equilibrium
holds, then v is determined by Y .
8We begin by introducing some notational conventions that will simplify
the algebra to come. If ν ∈ Rn, ∇(ν) will denote the n × n diagonal matrix
whose diagonal entries are the components of ν. Often we will denote such
a diagonal matrix with the capital letter corresponding to the lower case
letter denoting the vector. Thus P := ∇(p) and ∆ := ∇(δ). For Y ∈ Y and
v ∈ [0,1]n let M(Y ) := ∇(m(Y )).
Fix Y ∈ Y. We will write M in place of M(Y ). Let I be the n × n




M + p0I − PY T 
∆v + p
and then as Av = p where, for Y ∈ Y,
A = A(Y ) := I −
 
M + p0I − PY T 
∆.
Let A = (aij); then
aij =
 
1 − (mi + p0 − pi)δi, j = i,
pjyijδi, j  = i.
Proposition 1. A is invertible.
In preparation for the proof, and for a key result later, we quickly review
the theory of nonsingular M-matrices. A square matrix is a nonsingular M-
matrix if it has positive entries on the diagonal and nonpositive oﬀ-diagonal
entries, and is dominant diagonal, meaning that for each column, the sum of
the entries is positive. The main properties of these matrices are as follows:
Lemma 2. If B is a nonsingular M-matrix, then B is invertible, and the
entries of its inverse are nonnegative. The determinants of the principal
minors are nonnegative, so if B is symmetric, then it is positive deﬁnite.
Proof. E.g., Theorem 2.3 of Chapter 6 of Berman (1979).
Lemma 3. B := A − pδT is a nonsingular M-matrix.
Proof. Let B = (bij). Then for j  = i we have bji = pj(yij − 1)δi, and of


















= (1 − p0 − mi)δi < bii.
9Proof of Proposition 1. In view of the last result, the entries of B−1 are
nonnegative, so 1 + δTB−1p > 0, and consequently the Sherman-Morrison
formula3 implies that A = B + pδT is invertible.
Now that Proposition 1 is established, for Y ∈ Y we may deﬁne
v(Y ) := A(Y )−1p.







Y(v) := Y1(v) ×     × Yn(v).
Then (v,Y ) satisﬁes condition (a) of the deﬁnition of reduced equilibrium if
and only if v = v(Y ), and it satisﬁes condition (b) if and only if Y ∈ Y(v).
Let F : Y → Y be the correspondence F(Y ) := Y(v(Y )).
Proposition 2. The correspondence F is upper semicontinuous and convex
valued. A point Y ∈ Y is a ﬁxed point of F if and only if (v(Y ),Y ) is a
reduced equilibrium.
Proof. Since each Yi(v) is the subset of Yi that minimizes a linear function,
Y(v) is compact and convex, so F is convex valued. The minimization
problem varies continuously with v, and v(Y ) is a continuous function of Y ,
so Berge’s theorem of the maximum implies that F is upper semicontinuous.
Condition (a) in the deﬁnition of a reduced equilibrium is equivalent to the
requirement that v = v(Y ), and condition (b) is equivalent to Y ∈ Y(v).
5 The General Uniqueness Result
This section explains the general mathematical principle underlying the
uniqueness asserted in Theorem 1. We ﬁrst review the relevant results
concerning the ﬁxed point index, then describe the general class of cor-
respondences for which we are able to show that the set of ﬁxed points has
a single connected component.
3If B is a nonsingular n×n matrix, u,v ∈ R
n are column vectors, and λ := v
TB
−1u  =






−1/(1 + λ) can be veriﬁed by
multiplying the right hand side by B + uv
T. (Cf., p. 124 of Meyer (2001).)
10Let D ⊂ Rm be a nonempty compact convex set, and let F : D → D be
an upper semicontinuous convex valued correspondence. Between Brouwer’s
(1910) proof of his ﬁxed point theorem and the middle of the last century,
there emerged a theory of a ﬁxed point index that assigns an integer to
each closed set of ﬁxed points of F that is isolated, in the sense of having
a neighborhood containing no other ﬁxed points. More generally, an index
admissible correspondence is an upper semicontinuous convex valued corre-
spondence F : U → D where U ⊂ D is open in the relative topology of D,
U is its (relative) closure, and F has no ﬁxed points in ∂U := U \ U. Let C
be the set of index admissible correspondences.
Proposition 3. There is a unique function Λ : C → Z satisfying the fol-
lowing conditions:
(A) (Normalization) If c : D → D is a constant function, then Λ(c) = 1.
(B) (Additivity) If F : U → D is index admissible, U1,... ,Ur ⊂ U are
open and pairwise disjoint, and U \ (U1 ∪     ∪ Ur) contains no ﬁxed





(C) (Homotopy) If h : U × [0,1] → D is a homotopy (i.e., a continuous
function) such that for each 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, ht := h( ,t) : U → D is an
index admissible function, then Λ(h0) = Λ(h1).
(D) (Continuity) If F : U → D is index admissible, then there exists
a neighborhood V ⊂ U × D of the graph of F such that Λ(F′) =
Λ(F) whenever F′ : U → D is an upper semicontinuous convex valued
correspondence whose graph is contained in V.
It can be shown (e.g., McLennan (1989)) that if F ∈ C and the domain
of F is all of D, then Λ(F) = 1. (Since any two continuous functions from D
to itself are homotopic, because D is convex, its validity for functions follows
from Normalization and Homotopy; the main diﬃculty is to show that any
upper semicontinuous convex valued correspondence can be approximated
by a continuous function, so that its validity for correspondences follows
from Continuity.) In particular, for any partition of the set of ﬁxed points
into isolated sets, the sum of the indices of the sets must be one.
We now introduce the framework of the general uniqueness result, which
is slightly more general than the framework of the last two sections. Let
  ,   : Rm × Rk → R
11be a given bilinear pairing, let Y ⊂ Rm be a compact, convex polytope, and
for v ∈ Rk let
Y(v) := argminY ∈Y Y,v .
Let v : Y → Rk be a C1 function, and let F : Y → Y be the correspondence
F(Y ) := Y(v(Y )).
The argument used to prove Proposition 2 shows that this F also satisﬁes
the hypotheses of Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem.
We will say that E ⊂ Y is an attracting set for Y and v if it is nonempty
and (i)-(iv) below are satisﬁed.
(i) v is constant on E.
Let v be the constant value of v on E.
(ii) E ⊂ Y(v).
Note that, by (i) and (ii), E is contained in the set of ﬁxed points of F.
(iii) E is the intersection of Y with an aﬃne subspace of Rm.
Let K be the linear subspace of Rm that is parallel to the aﬃne hull of
Y(v). That is, K is the smallest linear subspace of Rm such that Y(v) =
(Y +K)∩Y for all Y ∈ Y(v). Similarly, let L be the linear subspace of Rm
that is parallel to the aﬃne hull of E, so L is the smallest linear subspace of
Rm such that E = (Y + L) ∩ Y for all Y ∈ E. Concretely, K is the span of
all vectors of the form Y ′ − Y ′′ where Y ′,Y ′′ ∈ Y(v), and L is the span of
all vectors of the form Y ′−Y ′′ where Y ′,Y ′′ ∈ E. Note that L ⊂ K. We say
that Z ∈ K is inward pointing if there is Y0 ∈ E and Y ∈ Y(v) such that
Z is a positive scalar multiple of Y − Y0. We say that Z is strictly inward
pointing if there are such Y0 and Y with Y / ∈ E.
(iv)  Z,Dv(Y0)Z  > 0 for all Y0 ∈ E and all strictly inward pointing Z.
Our main goal in this section is:
Theorem 2. If each ﬁxed point of F is contained in an attracting set, then
the set of ﬁxed points of F is a single attracting set.
We explain the argument by repeatedly reducing the claim to a simpler
and more technical assertion. To begin with:
Proposition 4. If E is an attracting set, then there is a neighborhood U ⊂
Y such that the set of ﬁxed points of F in U is E, and Λ(F|U) = 1.
12Proof of Theorem 2. Proposition 4 implies that each attracting set of ﬁxed
points has a neighborhood U as above. Since (by upper semicontinuity)
the set of ﬁxed points is compact, it consists of ﬁnitely many attracting
sets. Since Λ(F) = 1, and, by Additivity, Λ(F) is equal to the number of
attracting sets, there is exactly one attracting set.
We now need to prove Proposition 4. Fix an attracting set E and let v
be the constant value of v on E. Let K be the linear subspace of Rm that
is parallel to the aﬃne hull of Y(v), and let L be the linear subspace of Rm
that is parallel to the aﬃne hull of E.
The general idea is to “deform” the given correspondence F to one whose
set of ﬁxed points is known. We ﬁx a particular point Y0 ∈ E and deﬁne a
function u : Y × [0,1] → Rk by setting
u(Y,t) := (1 − t)v(Y ) + tDv(Y0)(Y − Y0),
and deﬁne the correspondence H : Y × [0,1] → Y by
H(Y,t) := argminY ′∈Y(v) Y ′,u(Y,t) .
Following notational conventions that are standard for homotopies, let Ht
denote the correspondence H( ,t) : Y → Y “at time t.”
There are now three results concerning, respectively, the ﬁxed points of
H0, H1, and Ht for all t. The proof of the last of these is harder, and is
deferred until after the proof of Proposition 4.
Lemma 4. There is a neighborhood U ⊂ Y of E with H0(Y ) = F(Y ) for
all Y ∈ U.
Proof. The diﬀerence between F and H0 is that F is deﬁned by minimizing
over Y while H0 is deﬁned by minimizing over Y(v), but, by continuity (and
because Y is a polytope) argminˆ Y ∈Y ˆ Y ,v(Y )  ⊂ Y(v) for all Y in some
neighborhood of E.
Lemma 5. The set of ﬁxed points of H1 is E.
Proof. Fix a point Y0 ∈ E. First suppose Y ∈ E. Then Y ∈ Y(v) by (ii).
In addition, since v is constant on E, the kernel of Dv(Y0) contains L, and
consequently
Y ∈ H1(Y ) := argminY ′∈Y(v) Y ′,Dv(Y0)(Y − Y0)  = Y(v).
Thus E is contained in the set of ﬁxed points of H1.
13Now suppose that Y ∈ Y \ E. We wish to show that Y is not a ﬁxed
point of H1, so we may assume that Y ∈ Y(v) because H1(Y ) is contained









Since u(Y,1) = Dv(Y0)(Y − Y0), it follows that Y / ∈ H1(Y ).
Lemma 6. There is a neighborhood U ⊂ Y of E such that for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
the set of ﬁxed points of Ht in U is E.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let U be a neighborhood of E with the properties
given by Lemmas 4 and 6. Replacing U with a smaller neighborhood of E if
need be, we may assume that for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 the set of ﬁxed points of Ht
in U is E. Then Continuity implies that Λ(Ht|U) is constant as a function of
t, and Lemma 5 implies that Λ(H1|U) = 1, so Λ(H0|U) = 1. Since F agrees
with H0 on U, it follows that Λ(F|U) = 1.
The remaining task is the proof of Lemma 6. The intuition underlying
local uniqueness in coalitional bargaining is that as we change Y , say near
Y0, the agents who are included more frequently in minimal winning coali-
tions should have higher continuation values, which increases the expense of
coalitions including many of them, in comparison with others that might be
used. The net eﬀect is to encourage change in the opposite direction, and
for this reason there must be disequilibrium at points near E that are not
actually in E. The next result “integrates” condition (iv) in the deﬁnition
of an attracting set, arriving at an algebraic expression of this idea that is
valid in some neighborhood of E.
Lemma 7. There is a neighborhood W ⊂ Y(v) of E in the relative topology
of Y(v) such if Y ∈ W \ E and Y1 is the point in E closest to Y , then
 Y − Y1,v(Y ) − v(Y1)  > 0.
Proof. Let M := K∩L⊥; since L is a subspace of K, every element of K has
an orthogonal decomposition as a sum of an element of L and an element
of M. Since Y(v) is a convex polytope, there is a number δ > 0 such that
 X  ≤ δ T  whenever Y ∈ Y(v) \ E, Y1 is the point in E closest to Y , and
Y − Y1 = T + X where X ∈ L and T ∈ M. Let
C = {(X,T) ∈ L × M :  X  ≤ δ and  T  = 1}.
Then C is compact, so condition (iv) and continuity imply that there is
a κ > 0 such that
 
  Z,Dv(Y1)Z 
 
  ≥ κ Z 2 whenever (X,T) ∈ C and
14Z = T +X. More generally, this inequality holds whenever Z = T +X with
T ∈ M, X ∈ L, and  X  ≤ δ T . Choose ε > 0 with ε < κ, and let W be
a convex neighborhood of E in Y(v) that is small enough that
 Dv(Y ) − Dv(Y1)  := max
 U =1
 (Dv(Y ) − Dv(Y1))U  < ε
whenever Y ∈ W and Y1 is the point in E that is closest to Y .
Now ﬁx Y ∈ W \ E and let Y1 be the point in E closest to Y . Since
v(Y ) − v(Y1) =
  1
0
Dv((1 − t)Y1 + tY )(Y − Y1)dt
we have
 

















Y −Y1,(Dv((1−t)Y1+tY )−Dv(Y1))(Y −Y1)
 
dt
≥ κ Y −Y1 2 −
  1
0
 Y −Y1   
 
Dv((1 −t)Y1 +tY )−Dv(Y1)
 
(Y −Y1) dt
≥ (κ − ε) Y − Y1 2 > 0.
We now combine the last result with the deﬁnition of Ht.
Proof of Lemma 6. Let W ⊂ Y(v) be as in Lemma 7. Let U ⊂ Y be a
neighborhood of E such that U ∩ Y(v) ⊂ W. Fix a particular t ∈ [0,1]. We
already know, from Lemma 5, that the set of ﬁxed points of H1 is E, so we
may assume that t < 1.
First suppose that Y ∈ E. Then Dv(Y0)(Y − Y0) = 0 because v is
constant on E. Thus u(Y,t) = (1 − t)v(Y ) = (1 − t)v, and Y is an element
of Ht(Y ) = Y(v). Thus E is contained in the set of ﬁxed points of Ht.
We need to show that U \E does not contain any ﬁxed points of Ht. Fix
Y ∈ U \ E. The image of Ht is contained in Y(v), so we may assume that
Y ∈ Y(v). Let Y ′ be the point in E closest to Y . Then v(Y ′) = v, and
Y − Y ′ ∈ K so  Y − Y ′,v(Y ′)  = 0. Therefore Lemma 7 implies that
 Y − Y ′,v(Y )  =  Y − Y ′,v(Y ) − v(Y ′)  > 0.
15We have Dv(Y0)(Y0 − Y ′) = 0, as explained above, so the deﬁnition of an
attracting set gives
 Y − Y ′,Dv(Y0)(Y − Y0)  =  Y − Y ′,Dv(Y0)(Y − Y ′)  > 0.
Multiplying the last two inequalities by 1 − t and t, then summing, gives
 Y − Y ′,u(Y,t)  > 0.
That is,  Y ′,u(Y,t)  <  Y,u(Y,t) , and consequently Y / ∈ Ht(Y ).
6 The Proof of Theorem 1
We now return to the framework of Section 4, so v(Y ) = A(Y )−1p. For
Y ∈ Y and v ∈ Rn let
 Y,v  = pTY T∆v,
and for v ∈ Rn let Y(v) = argminY ∈Y Y,v . As before F : Y → Y is the
correspondence F(Y ) = Y(v(Y )). Fix a particular ﬁxed point Y0 of F, and
let:
v := v(Y0), m := m(Y0), E := m−1(m).
Lemma 1 implies that for all Y ∈ E, (v,Y ) is a reduced equilibrium,
so v is constant on E, and E ⊂ Y(v). Since m is a linear function, E is
the intersection of Y with the aﬃne hull of E. Thus conditions (i)-(iii) of
the deﬁnition of an attracting set are satisﬁed. We will show that (iv) also
holds, so that E is an attracting set for Y and v, and since Y0 is an arbitrary
ﬁxed point of F, Theorem 2 will then imply that it is the entire set of ﬁxed
points of F. As we pointed out earlier, the other assertions of Theorem 1
follow from this, so that result will be established.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof that (iv) also holds.
Let K be the linear subspace of the Euclidean space containing Y that is
parallel to the aﬃne hull of Y(v), and let L be the linear subspace that is
parallel to the aﬃne hull of E. Condition (iv) follows from Lemma 8 below.
Lemma 8. If Z ∈ K is strictly inward pointing, then
 Z,Dv(Y0)Z  = pTZT∆Dv(Y0)Z > 0.
The rest of the section is devoted to the proof of this. We begin with
two technical facts.
16Lemma 9. If Z ∈ K is inward pointing and Zp = 0, then Z is not strictly
inward pointing.
Proof. We know that Z is a positive scalar multiple of Y − ˜ Y0 for some
Y ∈ Y(v) and ˜ Y0 ∈ E. We have m(˜ Y0 + tZ) = (˜ Y0 + tZ)p = ˜ Y0p = m(˜ Y0)
for all t, so ˜ Y0+tZ ∈ E for all t ≥ 0 such that ˜ Y0+tZ ∈ Y(v). In particular,
Y ∈ E.
Let V := ∇(v).
Lemma 10. For all Z ∈ K, Dv(Y0)Z = A−1V ∆Zp.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating the equation A(Y )v(Y ) = p gives
ADv(Y0)Z + (DA(Y0)Z)v = 0,
so the assertion is equivalent to −(DA(Y0)Z)v = V ∆Zp. Evaluating the
derivative of A shows that this is equivalent to
(∇(Zp) − PZT)∆v = V ∆Zp.
Since ZT∆v = 0, this is true if and only if ∇(Zp)∆v = V ∆Zp. But
commutativity of multiplication of diagonal matrices, and the fact that
∇(x)y = ∇(y)x for all x,y ∈ Rn, gives
∇(Zp)∆v = ∆∇(Zp)v = ∆V Zp = V ∆Zp.
Our general approach is inspired by Theorem 3 of Debreu (1952), which
asserts that if C is an n × n matrix, B is an m × n matrix, and xTCx > 0
for all nonzero x such that Bx = 0, then there is some λ > 0 such that
C + λBTB is positive deﬁnite.
Fix a strictly inward pointing Z ∈ K. Then ZT∆v = 0. (Observe that
Z is a scalar multiple of a diﬀerence Y ′−Y ′′ of two vectors in Y(v), and that
these are both minimizers of pTY T∆v. Since the columns of Y can be chosen
independently, it follows that Y ′′ and Y ′ both minimize each component of
Y T∆v.) The last result gives
pTZT∆Dv(Y0)Z = pTZT∆A−1V ∆Zp.
We ﬁrst put this is a symmetric form:
pTZT∆Dv(Y0)Z = 1












V AT + AV T 
(A−1)T∆Zp.
17Since A−1p = v and ZT∆v = 0, we have
pTZT∆A−1p = pTZT∆v = 0.




G(γ) := V AT + AV T − γpvT − γvpT.
To prove Lemma 8 it suﬃces (since Zp  = 0, by Lemma 9, and A−1 and ∆
are nonsingular) to ﬁnd γ such that G(γ) is positive deﬁnite.
The ﬁnal step in the proof is:
Lemma 11. If maxi δi ≤ γ < 1, then G(γ) is a symmetric nonsingular
M-matrix, so it is positive deﬁnite.







pj = 1 − p0,
so that aii = 1 − δi(mi − pi + p0) ≥ 1 − δi(1 − pi). Therefore
gii(γ) = 2aiivi − 2γpivi = 2(1 − δi(mi − pi + p0))vi − 2γpivi. (∗)
In particular,
gii(γ) ≥ 2vi(1 − δi(1 − pi) − γpi),
so gii(γ) > 0 because δi,γ < 1,
When i  = j we have aij = piδjyji, so that
gij(γ) = aijvj+ajivi−γ(pivj+pjvi) = (δjyji−γ)pivj+(δiyij−γ)pjvi. (∗∗)
Therefore gij(γ) ≤ 0 when i  = j because γ ≥ δi for all i.
We have shown that gij(γ) is positive when i = j and nonpositive when
i  = j. The remaining condition that we need to verify is that G(γ) is
dominant diagonal. Summing equations (∗) and (∗∗) above, then recognizing
that yii = 1, yields
n  
j=1



































pjyij) + (p0δi − 1)vi + pi,
so A = (1 − δip0)vi + pi, and consequently
n  
j=1













j=1pj = 1 − p0 we have
n  
j=1








In order to show that
 n
j=1 gij(γ) is positive it now suﬃces to show that  n
j=1 vj ≤ 1. Summing condition (a) of the deﬁnition of reduced equilibrium
over i, simplifying, and substituting
 n









pi = 1 − p0(1 −
n  
i=1






i=1 vi ≤ 1−p0, which implies the desired conclusion.
7 Future Research
Many questions and issues remain unresolved. An algorithm for comput-
ing the vector v of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium expected payoﬀs
could be an important tool supporting theoretical and empirical work based
19on this model. The deﬁnition of reduced equilibrium has a combinatoric as-
pect, namely which coalitions are least cost for each proposer, and a numer-
ical aspect. Unlike linear programming or Nash equilibrium for two person
games, even once the combinatoric aspect has been solved, the numerical
aspect is nonlinear, so there is little hope of ﬁnding an algorithm based
on linear pivoting such as the simplex algorithm for linear programming,
the Lemke-Howson algorithm (Lemke and Howson (1964)) for two player
games, or the Lemke (1965) algorithm for linear complementary problems.
Another potential approach to computation is based on homotopy: start-
ing with recognition probabilities for which the stationary subgame perfect
equilibrium payoﬀ vector is known, follow a path of (recognition probability
vector, payoﬀ vector) pairs until one reaches the recognition probabilities of
interest. Due to the nonlinearity, this approach is likely to be diﬃcult to
analyze theoretically, but may well be practical in many applications.
This problem is interesting from the point of view of computer science,
which has an active line of literature concerned with the complexity of com-
puting ﬁxed points, with special emphasis on the computation of Nash equi-
libria. (See Etessami and Yannakis (2007) and Papadimitriou (2007).) Com-
putation of the vector of continuation values is a special problem in this class
because it is nonlinear and a unique solution is guaranteed, but our proof
of uniqueness does not supply an algorithm. Recall that P is the class of
decision problems that can be decided by a Turing machine whose running
time is bounded by a polynomial function of the size of the input, and NP
is the class of decision problems such that a positive answer has a “witness”
that can be veriﬁed in polynomial time. For example, if a graph has a clique
of size k (that is, k vertices such that any two are the endpoints of an edge)
then such a clique is a witness for that fact. Similarly, coNP is the class of
decision problems for which a negative answer has an easily veriﬁed witness;
obviously it is the class of decision problems whose negations are in NP.
It is not known whether the intersection of NP and coNP contains prob-
lems that are not in P (whether NP contains problems that are not in P
is currently one of the most important open problems in mathematics) but
there are currently very few problems in the intersection of NP and coNP
for which no polynomial time algorithm is known. The best known exam-
ples are related to objects whose unique existence is guaranteed, speciﬁcally
factoring of integers and equilibrium payoﬀs of “simple” zero sum stochas-
tic games (cf. Johnson (2007)). Decision problems related to v are perhaps
a source of such problems, but because the components of v need not be
rational, it is not clear that such problems can be placed in NP.
There are many interesting questions concerning the vector v, which
20can be investigated either theoretically or computationally. Eraslan (2002)
shows that in the case of k-majority rule, if the recognition probabilities are
all the same, then the costs of players, as potential members of a coalition,
are ordered in the same way as the discount factors. That is, if δi ≤ δj, then
δivi ≤ δjvj. She also shows that if all players have the same discount factor,
then the costs of players are ordered in the same way as the recognition
probabilities, i.e., pi ≤ pj, then δivi ≤ δjvj. It is natural to ask whether
these results generalize to coalition structures that are symmetric in the
sense that for any i and j there is a permutation of N that maps i to j and
preserves (in the natural sense) the structure of the sets of minimal winning
coalitions. There are a host of additional questions concerning monotonicity
of vi as an agent i becomes more or less powerful due to changes in the
structure of the sets of minimal winning coalitions.
Our results permit the deﬁnition of a new power index. The Shapley
value (Shapley (1953), Shapley and Shubik (1954)) is a function that as-
signs a vector of payoﬀs to each TU game, and the Shapley-Shubik (Shapley
and Shubik (1954)) power index is the application of the Shapley value
to simple games. The power indices of Banzhaf (1965, 1968) Deegan and
Packel (1978) and Johnston (1978) are functions with the same domain and
range: each assigns a vector of individual “powers” to each simple game.
In our framework there is a simple game (the system of winning coalitions)
and other parameters, namely the recognition probabilities and the discount
factors. To obtain a power index comparable to those mentioned in Section
2 one may take the limit of our vector of equilibrium continuation payoﬀs,
for the case of symmetric recognition probabilities, as the common discount
factor goes to one. The power index obtained in this way has clear nonco-
operative foundations, in line with the Nash program. These are certainly
open to question in some applications, and can be compared with other
noncooperative foundations for cooperative solutions (e.g., Gul (1989)).
Many interesting topics concern generalizations or variations of the model.
It would be desirable to extend this paper’s model to allow for diﬀerent
proposer-coalition pairs to generate pies of diﬀerent size. Among other
things, one could then investigate the hypothesis that the coalitions that
form are the most productive. Whether our uniqueness result extends to
such a model is an open question. There seems to be considerable scope for
additional work on alternative bargaining protocols such as Chatterjee et al.
(1993), Ray (2007), and Kawamori (2008). Another possibility studied by
Montero (2006) is to search for vectors of recognition probabilities that are
self-conﬁrming in the sense that they coincide with the resulting vector of
continuation values. As we mentioned in the introduction, she shows that
21points in the nucleus of a proper simple game have this property. Compar-
ison of the properties of the various power indices seems like an interesting
direction for theoretical investigation.
Appendix
This appendix gives a precise description of the bargaining game and shows
that the expected payoﬀ vectors generated by its stationary subgame per-
fect equilibria satisfy the characterization given by the deﬁnition of reduced
equilibrium. This involves a certain amount of advanced measure theory,
but, taking these tools as given, the work is straightforward and unsurpris-
ing. Since, quite understandably, many papers in this area do not ﬁll in
these details, we hope this appendix may be useful as a reference or model
for other authors.
We describe the progress of the game within a single active period in
terms of the space of within-period histories
H := H0 ∪ H1 ∪ ... ∪ Hn.
Here H0 is the set Σn of permutations of {1,... ,n}. There is a given
probability distribution q on Σn. If σ ∈ Σn is realized, then σ(1) is the
proposer, and the other agents vote on her proposal sequentially in the
order σ(2),... ,σ(n). Therefore pi/(1 − p0) =
 
σ(1)=i q(σ) for all i. (One
consequence of our analysis here is that other aspects of q have no inﬂuence
on equilibrium outcomes.) After σ is realized, σ(1) chooses a proposal x ∈ Π,
so H1 = Σn×Π. The agents then vote in order, with each seeing the proposal
and the earlier agent’s votes, then choosing an element of {Yes,No}, so that
for each k = 1,... ,n,
Hk := Σn × Π × {Yes,No}k−1.
For k = 0,... ,n −1 and i = 1,... ,n let Hk
i be the set of within-period
histories in Hk at which agent i chooses. Thus H0
i = {σ ∈ H0 : σ(1) = i},
and for k = 2,... ,n we have
Hk
i = {(σ,x,bσ(2),... ,bσ(k)) ∈ Hk : σ(k + 1) = i}.
The measure-theoretic description of behavior strategies involves transi-
tion probabilities. In general, if (Ω,A) is a measurable space, let P(Ω) be the
22set of probability measures on Ω. If (Ω1,A1) and (Ω2,A2) are measurable
spaces, a function P12 : Ω1 → P(Ω2) is a transition probability if
P12( )(A2) : Ω1 → [0,1]
is measurable for all A2 ∈ A2. Let P(Ω1,Ω2) be the set of transition prob-
abilities from Ω1 to Ω2.




Fix proposer strategies π1,... ,πn for the various agents. A (stationary)
responder strategy for agent i is a transition probability
ρi ∈ P(H1
i ∪ ... ∪ Hn−1
i ,{Yes,No}).
Fix responder strategies ρ1,... ,ρn.
Let
π ∈ P(H1,Π)
be the transition probability that agrees with πi on each H0
i . Abusing nota-
tion, we also use the symbol π to denote the proﬁle (π1,... ,πn); the correct
interpretation will always be clear from context. Let ρ := (ρ1,... ,ρn), and
for h = 1,... ,n − 1 let
ρh ∈ P(Hh,{Yes,No})
be the transition probability that agrees with ρi on each Hh
i .
We now need to deﬁne and characterize the measures on H0,... ,Hn
induced by (π,ρ). The following result generalizes Fubini’s theorem and is
a fundamental result for the theory of Markov chains.
Lemma A.1. For any λ ∈ P(Ω1) and P12 ∈ P(Ω1, Ω2) there is a unique
probability measure λ ⊗ P12 ∈ P(Ω1 × Ω2) satisfying








is a measurable function of ω1, and
 
Ω1×Ω2








23Proof. E.g., Proposition III.2.1 of Neveu (1965).
The measure on Hn induced by q and (π,ρ) is now seen to be
q ⊗ π ⊗ ρ1 ⊗     ⊗ ρn−1.
Let O be the disjoint union of Π and {No}, endowed with the obvious σ-
algebra, and deﬁne the outcome function o : Hn → O by setting
o(σ,x,bσ(2),... ,bσ(n)) =
 
x, {i} ∪ {j : bj = Yes} ∈ Sσ(1),
No, otherwise.
The measure on O induced by (π,ρ) is
(q ⊗ π ⊗ ρ1 ⊗     ⊗ ρn−1) ◦ o−1.
In order to deﬁne subgame perfection we need to also deﬁne the measures
on O induced by beginning with a particular partial history and continuing





(δh ⊗ π ⊗ ρ1 ⊗     ⊗ ρn−1) ◦ o−1, h ∈ H0,
(δh ⊗ ρj ⊗     ⊗ ρn−1) ◦ o−1, h ∈ Hj, j = 1,... ,n − 1,
δh ◦ o−1, h ∈ Hn.
For h ∈ H and v ∈ V we deﬁne τ(h,π,ρ,v) ∈ [0,1]n by setting




To simplify notation we will usually write τ(π,ρ,v) in place of τ(A,π,ρ,v).
We say that (π,ρ) is a within period subgame perfect v-equilibrium if
τi(h,π,ρ,v) ≥ τi(h,(π1,... , ˜ πi,... ,πn),(ρ1,... , ˜ ρi,... ,ρn),v)
for all h ∈ H, all i = 1,... ,n, and all proposer strategies ˜ πi and responder
strategies ˜ ρi for i.
Since it would be tedious and serve little purpose, we will not give a
formal deﬁnition of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. Informally, a
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is a pair (π,ρ) such that after any
history of the larger game, playing according to these strategies is optimal.
Stationarity implies that there is a well deﬁned vector v of expected payoﬀs
prior to the beginning of the game, and that this vector satisﬁes the ﬁxed
24point characterization above: each player i’s expected payoﬀ consists of the
probability that the game ends in the current period, times the expected
payoﬀ conditional on this event, plus the probability that it does not end
times δivi. Subgame perfection clearly implies that the the pair (π,ρ) is
a within period subgame perfect v-equilibrium. On the other hand, (π,ρ)
is a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium whenever it is a within period
subgame perfect v-equilibrium and v is also the vector of expected payoﬀs
when behavior in the ﬁrst period is governed by (π,ρ) and the value of
failure to reach agreement is given by the numbers δivi.
For the remainder of the Appendix we work with a ﬁxed v ∈ V and a
within period subgame perfect v-equilibrium (π,ρ). Consider a particular
k = 2,... ,n and h = (σ,x,bσ(2),... ,bσ(k−1)) ∈ Hk let
C(h) := {σ(1)} ∪ {σ(j) : 2 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and bσ(j) = Yes}
be the set of agents who have voted to approve the proposal, let
D(h) := {σ(j) : j = k,... ,n and xσ(j) > δσ(j)vσ(j) }
be the set of agents in {σ(k),... ,σ(n)} who prefer x to their disagreement
payoﬀ, and let
D(h) := {σ(j) : j = k,... ,n and xσ(j) ≥ δσ(j)vσ(j) }
be the set of agents in {σ(k),... ,σ(n)} who do not prefer their disagreement
payoﬀ to x.
From this point forward we assume that supersets of winning coalitions
are winning. That is, for each i and Si ∈ Si, if Si ⊂ Ti ⊂ N, then Ti ∈ Si.
Lemma A.2. If C(h)∪D(h) ∈ Sσ(1), then the proposal will be implemented
with probability one.
Proof. The claim is certainly correct if k = n, since then the last agent will
vote according to her interest if her vote makes a diﬀerence. Suppose it
is true with k replaced with k + 1. If σ(k) / ∈ D(h), then passage of the
proposal is certain, by virtue of the induction hypothesis, regardless of how
σ(k) votes. (In particular, σ(k) cannot defeat the proposal by voting in
favor of it.) If σ(k) ∈ D(h), then σ(k) can insure passage of the proposal by
voting in favor, and in a subgame perfect equilibrium will not vote against
unless passage is also guaranteed in that event.
Lemma A.3. If C(h) ∪ D(h) / ∈ Sσ(1), then the probability of implementing
the proposal is zero.
25Proof. The claim is certainly correct if k = n, since then the last agent will
vote according to her interest if her vote makes a diﬀerence. Suppose it is
true with k replaced with k+1. If σ(k) ∈ D(h), then regardless of how σ(k)
votes the proposal will certainly not be implemented, and if σ(k) / ∈ D(h),
then σ(k) can insure rejection by voting against, and will only vote in favor
if that also results in rejection with probability one.
For i = 1,... ,n deﬁne





For each i let
S∗




be the set of minimum cost coalitions. For each σ ∈ Σn and k = 1,... ,Kσ(1)
let η∗
σ(k) be the probability that πσ(1)(A,σ) assigns to the allocation in which
each member j of Sσ(1)k receives δjvj, σ(1) receives 1 −
 
j∈Sσ(1)k δjvj, and
all other agents receive 0.






and the proposal is accepted with probability one.
Proof. Lemma A.2 implies that σ(1) can insure the implementation of any
proposal x such that {j  = σ(1) : xj > δjvj } ∈ Sσ(1). Lemma A.3 implies
that σ(1) cannot hope to implement a proposal x with {j  = σ(1) : xj ≥
δjvj } / ∈ Sσ(1). Combining these two results, we ﬁnd that σ(1) has expected
utility wσ(1)(v), and that this expected utility can be achieved only if a
proposal is implemented with probability one.
At this point we have shown that every vector of expected payoﬀs result-
ing from a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is the ﬁrst component of
a reduced equilibria. We conclude by proving the converse, which also es-
tablishes that our theory is not vacuous because stationary subgame perfect
equilibria actually exist.
Proposition A.4. Consider v ∈ V and (π,ρ) such that:
26(i) for each σ ∈ Σn, πσ(1) assigns all probability to proposals such that,
for some Sσ(1),k ∈ S∗
i (v), each member j of Sσ(1)k receives δjvj, σ(1)
receives 1 −
 
j∈Sσ(1)k δjvj, and all other agents receive 0;
(ii) for each i, in response to a proposal x with xi ≥ δivi, ρi assigns all
probability to voting to accept, and in response to a proposal x with
xi < δivi, ρi assigns all probability to voting to reject.
Then (π,ρ) is a within period subgame perfect x-equilibrium.
Proof. Since, under ρ, a responder’s vote has no eﬀect on the votes of subse-
quent voters, it is clear there is no improving deviation from ρ. Given that
responders are playing ρ, the proposer σ(1) is achieving the expected payoﬀ
wσ(1)(v), and Lemma A.3 implies that there is no way to do better than
this.
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